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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of Brazil's Bolsa Escola (later renamed Bolsa Familia) program on 
children's progress in school in Brazil.  The Bolsa program, which started in the 1990s and expanded 
rapidly in 2001 and 2002, provides monthly cash payments to poor households if their children (between 
the ages of 6 and 15) are enrolled in school.  Using eight years of school census data (from 1998 to 2005), 
our estimation method compares changes in enrollment, grade advancement and dropout rates across public 
schools that adopted the Bolsa program in different years.  We estimate that the Bolsa program increased 
school enrollment in grades 1-4 by about 2.8% in the initial years and by about 5.5% in the long run (after 
three years).  We also estimate that the program reduced the drop out rate for children in grades 1-4 by 
about 0.3 percentage points in the first year and by about 0.55 percentage points in the long run (after two 
years), and increased the grade promotion rate by about 0.5 percentage points after one year and by about 1 
percentage point in the long run (after two years).  Similar results are found for children in grades 5-8.  
Since only about 43% of Brazilian children are eligible to participate in the program, the impacts of the 
Bolsa program on these education outcomes for the target population (poor families) is arguably at least 
twice as high as these estimated impacts for the population as a whole. 
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Resumo 
O presente estudo analisa o impacto do Programa Bolsa Escola/Família no desempenho escolar de crianças 
no Brasil. O Programa Bolsa, que se iniciou nos anos 90 e se expandiu rapidamente em 2001 e 2002, 
fornece renda mensal às famílias pobres condicionado aos filhos (entre 6 e 15 anos) permanecerem na 
escola. Utilizando um painel com 8 anos do censo escolar (de 1998 a 2005), o método de estimação 
adotado compara mudanças na taxa de matrícula, aprovação e abandono de alunos nas escolas públicas 
com estudantes  recebendo o programa Bolsa com relação as escolas sem alunos recebendo o programa, em 
diferentes períodos de tempo. Os resultados mostraram que o Programa Bolsa é responsável pelo aumento 
nas matrículas de 1ª. a 4ª. série em 2.8% no ano inicial e em 5.5% no longo prazo (após 3 anos). Estimou-se 
ainda que o programa reduziu a taxa de abandono de crianças de 1ª. a 4ª. série em 0.3 pontos percentuais no 
primeiro ano e em torno de 0.55 pontos percentuais no longo prazo (após três anos), e aumentou a taxa de 
aprovação em 0.5 pontos percentuais após um ano e em 1 ponto percentual no longo prazo (após dois 
anos). Resultados semelhantes foram obtidos para crianças da 5ª. a 8ª. série. Uma vez que em torno de 43% 
das crianças são elegíveis para participar do programa, os impactos do programa Bolsa Escola/Família 
nestes indicadores educacionais para a população alvo (famílias pobres) são pelo menos duas vezes maior 
do que os impactos estimados para a população como um todo.  
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Most economists agree that increased levels of education can lead to increased economic 
growth and higher incomes (Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Hanushek and Kimko, 
2000; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008) and, 
more generally, a higher quality of life.  This support for education among economists is matched 
by even greater enthusiasm among, and financial support from, international development 
institutions.  Indeed, two of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted at the 
United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000 focus on education: first, all children 
should complete primary school by 2015, and second, gender equality should prevail at all levels 
of education by 2015. 
To achieve the Millennium Goals, parents must first be able to overcome the economic and 
social barriers to enrolling their children in school.  These barriers include not only the direct cost 
of schooling, such as school fees, books and uniforms, but also the opportunity cost of time in 
school – the reduction in the amount of time children spend working or doing other activities 
when they increase the time they spend studying, both in school and at home.  Several programs 
have gone beyond reducing or eliminating fees or providing free textbooks and uniforms: they 
actually pay the families of students who attend school.  These programs are called conditional 
cash transfer programs.  They have two main objectives: (1) alleviate current poverty; and (2) 
increase investments in human capital so that children in poor families will have a better standard 
of living when they become adults.  The first objective is accomplished when poor families 
receive money from the program.  The second is achieved by conditioning the cash transfers to 
households on certain behaviors of household members, such as visiting health facilities, 
immunizing young children, and enrolling older children in school.  Those programs have become 
widespread in developing countries, especially in Latin America.  The two largest programs are 
the Progressa (later renamed Oportunidades) program in Mexico and the Bolsa Escola (later 
renamed Bolsa Familia) program in Brazil.  
Latin American countries have made significant progress toward increasing school 
enrollment and educational attainment in the past 25 years.  For example, the primary net 
enrollment rate increased from 70% in 1980 to 94% in 2004, and the secondary net enrollment rate 
increased from 16% to 61% over the same period (Damon and Glewwe, 2007).  But, there is room 
for further progress.  For example, although enrolment rates in Brazil increased from 86% in 1990 
to 97% in 2001 for younger children (8-11 years old), at age 14 this rate in 2001 was 92% and at 
age 15 only 87%.  Thus, in 2001 40% (nine million) of Brazilian youths from 18 to 25 years old 
had not completed 8 years of education (PNAD, 2001).  To encourage all children to complete 8 
years of schooling, Brazil’s Federal government launched the Bolsa Escola conditional cash 
transfer program in 2001. 
The Bolsa Escola program, which was renamed Bolsa Familia in 2003, provides benefits 
to poor families with children up to 15 years old, conditional on those children being enrolled in 
school.  Several studies have shown that conditional cash transfer programs increase students’ 
enrolment, decrease child labor, improve the nutritional and health status of young children, and 
even decrease income inequality.  For example, Gertler, Patrinos and Codina (2007) found a 
positive impact of the Progressa program on students’ educational outcomes in Mexico.  Gertler 
(2004) also demonstrated that the Progressa program improved the health of Mexican children.  
Turning to Brazil, Barros et al. (2006) estimate that the Bolsa Familia program decreased poverty 
and income inequality in that country, and Ferro, Kassouf and Levison (2007) show that the Bolsa 
Familia program reduced child labor.  While many studies have estimated the impact of Mexico’s 
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Rubalcava and Teruel, 2008), very few have analyzed the impact of the Bolsa Escola/Familia 
program on students’ educational outcomes in Brazil.  
This paper focuses on the educational outcomes of primary and lower secondary students 
in Brazil, the most populous country in Latin America.  It uses an unusually rich data set to 
evaluate the impact of Bolsa Escola/Familia program on children’s progress in school, as 
measured by enrollment, grade promotion and dropout rates, using school census data from 1998 
to 2005. It does so using panel data: the same school can be followed for eight years using 
Brazilian school census data.  Estimates are presented for schools with grades 1-4 and for schools 
with grades 5-8.   
The remaining sections of the paper provide a short literature review, describe the Bolsa 
Escola/Familia Program and the data, explain the estimation methodology, and present the 
estimation results.  A final section summarizes the findings and provides suggestions for further 
research. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Parker, Rubalcava and Teruel (2008) reviewed a large number of studies that have 
analyzed the impact of conditional cash transfer programs on schooling in Latin America and 
other developing countries.  Maluccio and Flores (2004) used a difference-in-differences approach 
to study the Red de Proteccion Social program in Nicaragua.  They estimate that the program 
increased enrolment by 17.7 percentage points, raised attendance by 11 percentage points, and 
improved retention rates by 6.5% for children in grades 1 to 4 in that country.  In Honduras, the 
Programa de Asignacion Familiar had a positive impact on both daily attendance and enrolment 
rates, and a negative effect on dropping out, for children age 6 to 13 (Glewwe and Olinto, 2004).  
Attanasio, Fitzsimons and Gomez (2005) found that the program Familias en Accion in Colombia 
increased enrolment among children age 12 to 17, but had no effect for children between 8 and 11 
years old.  Schady and Araujo (2006) obtained a positive impact of the program Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano on children’s enrolment in Ecuador.  Two programs of interest outside of 
Latin America are those in Bangladesh and Cambodia, which targeted girls’ education.  Khandker, 
Pitt and Fuwa (2003) found a positive impact on the enrolment of 11 to 18 years old girls in 
Bangladesh, while Filmer and Schady (2006), estimated that the Japan Fund for Poverty 
Reduction program in Cambodia significantly increased enrolment and attendance of girls in 
secondary school. 
Many, if not most, studies have focused on the impact of the Progresa program on 
children’s educational outcomes in Mexico.  Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2000) found that 
Progresa Program increased enrolment rates of 12 to 14 year old girls.  However, they did not find 
a significant impact on enrolment rates of individuals younger than 12.  They attributed this 
finding to already high enrolment rates for such individuals in pre-program data. They also found, 
for children between 11 and 15 years old, a significant reduction in the schooling gap, defined as 
the difference between the grade an individual would have completed if he or she entered school at 
age six and progressed one grade each year, and the grade actually attained. Schultz (2004) found 
a strong positive effect of the Progresa program on girls’ and boys’ school enrolment, with a 
stronger effect for girls.  Dubois, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2004) found that Progresa Program had 
a positive impact on the probability that children remain in school, and on grade progression and 
success at the primary level. However, for the secondary level the impact on grade progression 
was negative.  Lastly, Skoufias and Parker (2001) also found that the Progresa program 
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girls in Mexico.  
In contrast to the extensive research on Mexico’s Progresa program, only a few studies 
have evaluated the impact of Bolsa Escola/Familia on school enrollment, perhaps because the 
randomized implementation of the Progresa program greatly reduced difficulties in estimating 
program effects.  The first evaluation, done by the World Bank (2001), focused on the Bolsa 
program in the Federal District (which is Brazil’s capital, Brasilia) in 1995 and 1996.  This study, 
which consisted of simple comparisons of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, suggests that the 
Bolsa program reduced dropout rates by about 6 percentage points, increased grade promotion 
rates by 8-10 percentage points, but had little effect on Portuguese, math and science test scores.  
Yet this early study has several shortcomings.  First, and most important, it did not account for 
initial differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.  Second, it was conducted in the 
capital city, a relatively wealthy area that is not representative of the entire country.  Finally, the 
program has changed in many ways since 1995 and 1996, as explained below.    
Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003) analyze Brazilian household survey data collected 
in 1999 to estimate a model of household behavior that is then used to simulate the (future) impact 
of the Bolsa Escola program.  They estimate that the program will induce more than half of 
eligible youths who are currently not in school to enroll.  Yet the authors caution that the results 
heavily depend on technical assumptions and thus they attempt only “to obtain orders of 
magnitude for the likely effects of transfer programs of the Bolsa Escola type.”  While this paper 
is an interesting economic exercise, it is not intended to precisely estimate the impact of the Bolsa 
Escola/Familia program.  Some assumptions needed to provide identification for the model, such 
as the assumption that children who work outside the home and are not in school do not work in 
the household (p.237), are doubtful.  Overall, this paper provides little guidance as to the impact of 
the program. 
Two studies by Brazilian researchers are Cardoso and Souza (2003), and Ferro and 
Kassouf (2005).  They both estimate that the Bolsa Escola/Familia program has a large positive 
impact on school enrollment. However, these studies used cross-sectional data and did little to 
control for selection into the program and, more generally, omitted variable bias. Moreover, these 
evaluations used data from 2000 (the Demographic Census) and 2001 (PNAD, the National 
Household Sample Survey). Since the program became widespread nationally in the same year, 
2001, there is a need for new research to analyze the impact of the program after several years 
have passed.  
A much more recent and thorough study is that of de Janvry, Finan and Sadoulet (2007).  
They find that the Bolsa Escola/Familia program reduced dropout rates by about 8 percentage 
points but had little effect on repetition rates.  Yet this analysis is limited to the Northeast region 
of Brazil and has a much smaller sample of schools compared to the census data used in this 
paper, which reduces the precision of the estimated effects.  Some key variables are also missing 
from their data, such as the race of the students; it will be seen below that the impact of the 
program varies by race. 
In summary, despite the fact that the Bolsa Escola/Familia program is the largest 
conditional cash transfer program in the world, very little research has been done on it, and the 
research to date suffers from estimation problems, data that cover only part of the country, and (in 
most cases) analysis of the program in its very early stages.  The analysis presented here is based 
on data from all regions of Brazil, and uses data over eight years, including five years when the 
  3program was operating on a national scale.  Finally, it develops an estimate procedure designed to 
minimize selection bias and other estimation problems. 
 
III. Description of Bolsa Escola/Familia Program 
Brazil’s Bolsa Escola program began operating in 1995. Initially, it was not implemented 
at the national level; instead it was first implemented by a small number of municipios (equivalent 
to U.S. counties). The first two municipios to implement the Bolsa Escola program were the cities 
of Brasilia (also called the Federal District) and Campinas (located in São Paulo State). The 
program provided stipends (cash payments) to poor families with children from 6 to 15 years old 
conditional on their children being enrolled in school and attending at least 85% of school days.  
By 1998 more than 50 municipios  in seven states of Brazil (out of 26 plus the Federal District) 
had adopted a similar program. Yet this still accounts for only 1% of Brazil’s over 5000 
municipios.  
Given the program’s popularity and the positive results that started to appear from studies 
evaluating similar programs in other Latin American countries as well as in Brazil, the federal 
government, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, decided in April 2001 to create the 
Federal Bolsa Escola Program. According to the Social and Development Ministry, by the end of 
2001, almost 5 million families were receiving the stipend in more than 5,000 municipios (out of 
5,560). In 2003, under President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, Bolsa Escola became Bolsa Familia, 
and the program’s benefits were expanded. While Bolsa Escola included only poor families with 
children from 6 to 15 years old,
1 Bolsa Familia included all families with monthly per capita 
incomes below 60.00 Reals (30.00 dollars) and families with monthly per capita incomes between 
60.00 and 120.00 Reals that had children from 0 to 15 years old or a pregnant or breastfeeding 
woman. By 2007, more than 11 million families, or about 46 million people (about one fourth of 
Brazil’s population) were beneficiaries of the program. The government budget for Bolsa Familia 
has reached more than 7.5 billion Reals (about 4 billion U.S. dollars) in 2006, representing 0.5% 
of GNP. 
To be eligible for the Bolsa Familia program, families must have a monthly per capita 
income below 120.00 Reals, that is below one-half of Brazil’s minimum wage, and must have 
either children younger than 16 years old or a breastfeeding or pregnant woman. Families with 
income below 60.00 Reals per capita per month are considered to be in extreme poverty and 
receive the cash transfer even in the absence of children or a pregnant or breastfeeding woman. 
The monthly stipend paid to families varies from 15 Reals (approximately US$ 7) to 95 Reals 
(approximately US$ 47), depending on family income and the number of children. Families with a 
per capita income between 60 and 120 Reals per month, receive 15 Reals per beneficiary (either a 
child below age 16 or a pregnant or breastfeeding woman) up to a maximum of three beneficiaries 
per family (to avoid incentives to increase fertility). Families in extreme poverty (per capita 
income below 60 Reals per month) receive 50 Reals per month plus an additional 15 Reals per 
beneficiary, up to a maximum of three beneficiairies per family.  
Conditional cash transfer programs are often preferred to standard income transfer 
programs because of the conditionalities they impose on families. For example, the Bolsa Familia 
program requires that each child between ages 6 and 15 be enrolled in school and attend at least 
85% of school days, that pregnant women obtain prenatal and post natal health care services and 
that children between 0 and 7 years old have all the recommended vaccinations. The increase in 
human capital that should result from increased education and better health status is intended to 
                                                 
1 This program was expanded in March 2008 to include 16 and 17 year old youths. 
  4allow families to break out of their cycle of poverty, improve their quality of life and end their 
dependence on public assistance programs.  
To enroll in the Bolsa Familia program, poor families must fill out an application, which is 
available at the city hall of their municipio. The information provided on the application is used to 
select the families, taking into account the available budget and the estimated number of poor 
families in each municipio. These estimates are performed by members of the Ministry of Casa 
Civil and researchers from Geographical and Statistical Brazilian Institute (IBGE), Brazil’s 
national statistics agency, and the Applied Economics Research Institute (IPEA), a government 
economic research center. The numbers are based on the latest demographic census and recent 
household surveys (PNAD). 
 
IV. Data Available 
 This study uses school census data from 1998 to 2005 to create a panel of schools. Table 1 
shows the number of schools in each census. The focus is on children from 1
st to 8
th grade, which 
includes the age range eligible to receive benefits from the Bolsa Escola/Familia program. 
Schools may have 1
st to 4
th grade classes or 5
th to 8
th grade classes, or both, besides having 
preschool and/or higher levels, such as high school, adult education, and vocational classes. The 




th grade classes (or both) is presented in the third 





th grades. The reasons for this decline include demographic trends in Brazil (reduced 
fertility), a policy of merging small schools into larger ones, and a policy of closing some schools 





classes or both have declined since 1998, the number of preschools and high schools increased by 
more than 40% from 1998 to 2005. 
The fourth column in Table 1 shows how a panel data set was constructed for schools 
having 1
st to 4
th grade and/or 5
th to 8
th grade classes by merging the school census data over time, 





th grade classes. Of these, 174,153 could be matched (using school ID codes) with 
the 183,475 schools in 1999 census (a match rate of 95%). Each additional row in Table 1 shows 
how the panel set slowly becomes smaller as each additional year is merged in. Finally, in 2005 
there are 136,114 schools, of which 107,243 have data for all years from 1998 to 2005. 
The last 2 columns in table 1 show the percentage of schools participating in Bolsa 
Escola/Familia program in each year (more precisely, schools that report that one or more 





schools, respectively.  In 2001, only 23.5% of the 1-4 grade schools participated in the Bolsa 
Escola/Familia program. This number increased sharply in 2002 to 84.7%, but after that 
participation gradually increased each year, reaching 90.8% in 2005. Similarly, in 2001 only 
13.3% of the 5-8 grade schools had Bolsa and in 2005 this percentage increases to 86.4. 
 
 
V. Methodology  
Let yst be an educational outcome of interest, such as the enrollment rate, the grade 
promotion rate or the dropout rate, for school s at time t for a particular set of grades (e.g. grades 
1-4 or grades 5-8).  In general, yst is a function of child and household characteristics (denoted by 
the vector cist), school and teacher characteristics (sst), and whether the Bolsa program operates at 
that time in the municipio in which that school is located (Bst, which in our data is measured by 
  5whether the school reports one or more students participating in that program).
2  For simplicity, 
assume that this relationship is linear (a more general functional form, with interaction effects, is 
presented below): 
 
yst = α′cst + β′sst + γBst + εst   (1) 
 
where εst is a random error term that reflects idiosyncratic determinants of, and perhaps random 
measurement error in, yst. 
 If data were available for all the variables in cst and sst, and for the operation of the Bolsa 
program (Bst), one could estimate equation (2) by OLS and obtain consistent estimates of γ, the 
average impact of the availability of the Bolsa program on yst.  Unfortunately, many of the 
variables in cst and sst are not observed, and some may be almost impossible to measure.  For 
example, cst (child and household characteristics) could include child innate ability and parental 
tastes for schooling, and sst (school and teacher characteristics) could include principal and teacher 
motivation and a wide variety of hard to measure school characteristics.  Estimation of equation 
(1) using only observed variables in cst and sit effectively relegates all of the unobserved variables 
to the error term, εst, which is likely to cause this new error term to be correlated with the observed 
variables in cst and sst and with Bst and thus will lead to biased estimates of γ. 
One approach to overcome this bias is to find instrumental variables for the observed 
variables in cst and sst and for Bst, but no plausible instruments are available in our data.  Instead, 
we argue that the unobserved variables (and the observed variables as well) in cst and sst change 
slowly over time and thus they can be approximated by school and time fixed effects, plus state-
specific time trends (Brazil is composed of 26 states plus the Federal District).  This can be 
expressed as:  
 
α′cst + β′sst ≈ σs + τt + π01,j×D01,j×t + π02,j×D02,j×t (2) 
     
where σs is a (time invariant) school fixed effect, τt is a (school invariant) year fixed effect, D01,j is 
a dummy variable indicating a school in state j that adopted the Bolsa program in 2001, D02,j is a 
dummy variable indicating a school in state j that adopted the Bolsa program in 2002 or a later 
year, and t is a yearly time trend.  Note that time trends are allowed to vary across states and to be 
different for schools where Bolsa started in 2001 (about 23% of the schools) and schools where 
Bolsa was implemented in a later year (the rest of the schools, including the 2% where had not 
started by 2005). 
  Inserting (2) into (1) yields the simplest equation for estimating the impact of the Bolsa 
program on education outcomes: 
 
yst ≈ σs + τt + π01,j×D01,j×t + π02,j×D02,j×t + γBst + εst   (3) 
 
In fact, it is not necessary to substitute observed variables in cst and sit out of equation (1).  
If the assumptions behind this estimation method are correct, adding those observed variables will 
                                                 
2 Community characteristics, such as child wage rates, job prospects for educated adults, and local preferences for 
education, could be added to equation (1).  That is not done here to avoid notational clutter, and because the data 
available from Brazil include no community characteristics.  However, it is not difficult to include those variables; 
they could be specified in the same way that the school variables (sst) are specificed. 
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precise estimates of that parameter.  That is, one could estimate the following: 
 
yst ≈ α′cst + β′sst + σs + τt + π01,j×D01,j×t + π02,j×D02,j×t + γBst + εst   (4) 
 
where cst and sit are redefined to be only the observed child and school variables, respectively, and 






ulative impact after two years, and γ0 + γ1 + γ2 estimates the cumulative impact after three 
ears. 
VI. Re
 the school level regressions for grades 1-4, while the second presents 
the results for grades 5-8.   
The 
  An implicit assumption thus far is that the impact of the Bolsa program is the same for all 
children and all schools.  In fact, it is likely to vary across both children and schools.  Since only 
poor children are eligible for the program, then the impact should be strongest for those children 
and negligible for non-eligible children.  Turning to school variables, the program may have the 
largest effects in schools with meager facilities, or instead it may work best in schools that already 
have high quality facilities.  To examine whether the impact of the program varies by child and 
school characteristics, interaction terms between observed child and school variables and the 
Bolsa program variable can be added to equation (4): 
 
st ≈ α′cst + β′sst + σs + τt + π01,j×D01,j×t + π02,j×D02,j×t + γBst + δ′(cst×Bst) + θ′(sst×Bst) + εst    (5
 
To ease the interpretation of the coefficient estimates, cst and sst can be rescaled to have a mean of 
zero (that is, they are deviations from their mean values) so that γ is an estimate of the impact of 
the Bolsa program on a school with average child and school characteristics (for such a school the 
rescaled cst and sit variables all equal zero). 
  Another implicit assumption of the methodology is that the full impact of the Bolsa 
program occurs in the first year that it is adopted, and is the same in subsequent years.  Yet it may 
be more realistic to allow impacts to accumulate over time since children remain in the same 
school for several years and their cognitive skills are stocks that increase over time.  To estimate 
cumulative effects, one can add lagged program variables.  For example, equation (4) can be 
modified by including several lags: 
 
yst ≈ α′cst + β′sst + σs + τt + π01,j×D01,j×t + π02,j×D02,j×t + γ0Bst + γ1Bs,t-1 + γ2Bs,t-2 +
 





This section presents the regression results, using the methodology presented in Section V.  
The first subsection presents
 
A. Grades 1-4.  Table 2 presents the first set of estimates of the impact of the Bolsa 
program on (log) enrollment, dropping out and grade promotion for children in grades 1-4.  
top panel shows estimates for equation (3), the simplest econometric specification; in each 
regression the dependent variable is regressed on a dummy variable indicating that one or more 
  7students participated in the Bolsa program at a given school in a given year.  Recall that, to contro
for unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with the Bolsa variable, this regression (and 
all the other regressions presented in this paper) adds year fixed effects, school fixed effects, st
level time trends in schools that adopted Bolsa in 2001, and analogous trends for schools that 
adopted Bolsa in 2002 or later.  Additional time trends, based on enrollment in 1998, are added to 
account for the government’s policy of merging small schools into larger schools throughout this 
time period.  The impact of the Bolsa variable on all three education outcomes is highly sig
and has the expected sign.  More specifically, the presence of the Bolsa program increases 
enrollment by 2.8%, reduces the dropout rate by 0.31 percentage points, and increases the grade 
promotion rate by 0.53 percentage points.  Since only about 43% of the students are eligible for 
the program, adding the plausible assumption that the program had very little effect on ineligib
students implies that the program raised enrollment by 6.5% for eligible students, reduced the 
dropout rate for those students by about a 0.7 percentage point and increase the grade promotion
rate for those students by about 1.2 percentage points.  For reference, note that the net primary 


















 2 shows that adding these variables has no effect on the estimated impact of 
the Bol
 
                                                
% and the grade promotion rate was 71%. 
Of course, it is possible that the control variables used in the regression in the top panel of 
Table 2 do not completely remove confounding factors that are correlated with the Bolsa program.  
Intuitively, there may be other, unobserved changes that occurred in schools around the time that 
their students started to participate in the Bolsa program that affect these three dependent variable
and are not adequately captured by these control variables, which would lead to biased estimates
in that regression.  To check this possibility, we examine only the first three years of data, from 
1998 to 2000.  Suppose there is an unobserved dummy variable that has a direct causal impact 
these education variables and is highly correlated with the timing of the adoption of the Bolsa 
program; in some schools that adopted Bolsa in 2001 this variable would switch from zero
in 2000.
3  This implies that, using only the first three years of data, regressing these three 
dependent variables on a “fake” variable that equals zero for all schools in 1998 and 1999 but 
equals one in 2000 for the schools that adopted Bolsa in 2001 would lead to a significant impac
that variable on the dependent variables.  Such a regression is presented in the second pan
Table 2.  All of the coefficients are much smaller (an order of magnitude smaller for the 
enrollment and dropout regressions) than the Bolsa coefficients in the first panel, and all 
statistically insignificant.  This suggests that it is the Bolsa program itself, and not some 
unobserved school or community variables that are correlated with Bolsa, that causes the c
ol enrollment, dropping out and grade promotion seen in the top panel of Table 2. 
The last panel in Table 2 estimates equation (4) by adding a wide variety of school 
variables, plus a variable indicating the percentage of students who are girls, to the regression.  
Again, it is possible that changes in school facilities or school programs that are correlated with 
the Bolsa program are the real underlying causes of changes in enrollment, dropping out and grade
promotion. Yet table
sa program. 
Technically speaking, the estimates of the impact of the Bolsa program in Table 2 are 
estimates of the impact of the availability of the program on the average student.  Yet it is very 
likely that the impact will vary over different types of students and schools.  First, only students
 
3 For example, for the schools that adopted Bolsa in 2001 the associated variable switches from 0 to 1 in that year, 
while a variable that is highly correlated with the Bolsa dummy variable may switch from 0 to 1 in 2001 for about 
40% of those schools, and switch from 0 to 1 in 2000 in about 30% of those schools and in 2002 in the other 30%. 
  8from poor families are eligible for the program.  Second, among poor students the impact may 
vary because those students’ probabilities of enrolling, dropping out and being promoted vary; for 
example, Table 2 indicates that girls are more likely to be enrolled, less likely to drop out and 
more likely to be promoted to the next grade, which suggests that the program has less scope for 
improving girls’ education outcomes, relative to those of boys.  Third, the impact of the program 
may vary according to the quality of the school, as indicated by the presence of various facilities 
and programs.  The sign of this effect is ambiguous, as it depends on whether the Bolsa program i
a substitute or a complimen
s 


























Table 3 investigates differences in the impact of the Bolsa program over different types 
schools and different types of students by estimating equation (5), that is by adding interaction 
terms between the program variable and those variables.  Turning to the interactions with sch
characteristics, the positive average impact of the Bolsa program on enrollment is higher for 
schools with more computers and computer labs, libraries, and better educated teachers.  All
these (differential) effects are significant at the 1% level.  However, the impact is lower for 
schools that participate in the sch
ant only at the 5% level. 
Differential effects by schools characteristics are less likely to be statistically significant in
the drop out and grade promotion regressions.  For dropping out, it seems that all of the effect is 
for schools without libraries, since the interaction term between the program and that variable i
negative and very similar in size (-0.357) to the average impact of the Bolsa variable (0.324).  
Similarly, the impact of the program on dropping out also seems to be nullified by the exis
the computer program.  Finally, the positive impact of the program on grade promotion is 
amplified in schools that have computer labs but nullified in schools that have libraries, the s
TV program and the school computer program.  Overall, it is difficult to say why the Bolsa 
program has stronger or weaker impacts in some types of schools than in others, and until 
h is done one should probably not draw any policy conclusions from these results. 
Turning to the interactions with student characteristics, only three types of characteristics 
are considered because the school census data have only three such variables: sex and race and age
of students entering grade 1.  The first two were used to generate school level variables indicating
the proportion of students who were girls, black, mulatto, East Asian (“yellow”) and indigenous;
white is the omitted category for the race variable.  The race variable is available only for 2005,
yet the racial composition of schools is likely to change only very slowly over time.  Since the 
race data exist only for a single year, and the specification includes school fixed effects, race 
variables ca
.   
The third child variable, age when entering grade 1, was constructed by calculating the a
of children currently in grade one and then subtracting the repetition rate for that grade.  Since 
grade promotion is one of our dependent variables, this variable must be “purged” of any effec
its opposite, repetition, on the average age of children in grade 1.  This variable is intended 
measure households’ socio-economic status (which is not otherwise measured in the data); 
households with limited resources, and/or pare
heir children in school at a later age.   
In general, girls outperform boys in terms of enrollment, dropping out and grade 
promotion, so one may expect the Bolsa program to have smaller impacts for girls since all
these variables have upper limits.  Regarding race, black, mulatto and indigenous children 
  9generally have lower educational outcomes than do white and Asian children, so there is more 
scope for the program to increase their enrollment and grade promotion rates and reduce 
dropout rates.  Finally, children who start school at a late age tend to come from poorer, 
disadvantaged backgrounds, and there is also more pot
their 
ential for Bolsa to have an impact on them 
relative
n, 












 a 5.5% 
 





am is to raise grade promotion rates by about 2.3 percentage points 
for the 
he 
sample size is only about as third as large, since there are fewer schools at higher levels of 
 to children who start school at the usual time. 
The results in Table 3 show that the positive impact of the Bolsa program on enrollment is 
stronger for girls than for boys, and the negative impact on the Bolsa  program on dropping out is 
stronger for girls than for boys.  In contrast, the positive impact on grade promotion is somewhat 
smaller for girls than for boys.  Thus the program is particularly effective at helping girls enroll i
and stay in, school but is somewhat le
ed by grade promotion rates). 
Turning to differential impacts by race, as expected, the Bolsa program is more effectiv
increasing the enrollment rates of blacks, mulattos and indigenous children than it is for white 
children, which suggests that it equalizes enrollment rates by race.  Somewhat surprisingly, it also 
increases enrollment rates of Asian students, again relative to whites, despite the fact that Asians’
enrollment rates are not lower than those of whites.  Turning to dropping out rates, there is little
difference by race, except that the negative impact of the Bolsa  program is weaker for blacks.
This may reflect the fact that increasing enrollment for relatively weak students may, in late
years, lead to increased dropping out for those schools.  Finally, the positive impact of the 
program on grade promotion is somewhat smaller for blacks, indigenous students, and Asians, 
although the impact for blacks is significant only at the 10% level.  One possible explanation fo
these negative effects is that the increase in enrollment rates fo
 weak students, who are more likely to repeat a grade. 
The specifications in Tables 2 and 3 are relatively simplistic in that they assume that th
program has an impact that does not depend on how many years the program is in place.  Yet 
impacts may accumulate over time as students receive the “treatment” for longer periods of time.  
Table 4 estimates equation (6), that is it examines the extent of such cumulative effects by adding 
lag variables for the Bolsa variable that go back three years.  For all three dependent variables, the 
impacts accumulate over time, but peak after two or three years.  More specifically, the impact on
the enrollment rate is a 2.8% increase after one year, a 4.3% increase after two years, and
increase after three years.  Assuming that all of this effect is concentrated on the eligible 
population (i.e. the poor population), which constitute about 43% of the total population of school
age children, these results indicate that the long-run impa
 them about 13% among the eligible population. 
Similarly, the impact of the Bolsa program on dropout rates and grade promotion rates also
accumulates over time, although the full effect is felt after two years.  The estimates indicate tha
the program reduces the dropout rate by 0.3 percentage points after one year and by about 0.45 
percentage points after two years.  Assuming again that all of this impact is concentrated on the 
eligible population implies that the program reduces the dropout rate for the average person in the
eligible population by about 1.0 percentage point.  Turning to estimates of the program’s impact 
on grade promotion rates, they indicate that the program raises that rate by about 0.5 percentage 
points after one year and by nearly 1.0 percentage points after two years, which implies that the 
long-run impact of the progr
eligible population. 
B. Grades 5-8.  Table 5 repeats the analysis in Table 2 for children in grades 5-8.  T
  10education, but the sample is still unusually large at around 182,000 observations (nearly 23,000 
schools over eight years).   
Beginning with the simplest specification in the top panel of Table 5, the Bolsa program 
appears to increase enrollment by about 3.2 percentage points, which (assuming that all of this 
impact is concentrated on the 43% of the population of school age children that is eligible for the 
program) implies an increase in enrollment of about 7.4 percentage points for the eligible 
population.  The estimates also indicate that the program reduces dropout rates, and raises grade 
promotion rates, by about 0.3 percentage points for the population as a whole, and by about 0.7% 
of the eligible population.  These estimates are strikingly similar to those in Table 2, with the 
exception that the impact on grade promotion rates is only about half as large.  This probably 
reflects the fact that repetition rates in grades 5-8 are lower than those in grade 1-4.  
The second and third panels in Table 5 check the robustness of the results in the first panel.  As in 
Table 2, the second panel generates a “fake” Bolsa variable to check whether the impacts seen in 
the first panel are in fact due to something else.  Again, there is no evidence of that the first panel 
regressions are biased.  Similarly, the third panel adds a variety of school variables to see whether 
changes in those variables may be leading to biased estimates of the impact of the Bolsa program.  




This paper focuses on the educational outcomes of primary and lower secondary students 
in Brazil.  It uses an unusually rich data set to evaluate the impact of Bolsa Escola/Familia 
program on children’s progress in school, as measured by enrollment, grade promotion and 
dropout rates, using school census data from 1998 to 2005. It does so using panel data: the same 
school can be followed for eight years using Brazilian school census data.  By 2007, more than 11 
million families, or about 46 million people (about one fourth of Brazil’s population) were 
beneficiaries of the Bolsa program, considered the largest in the world. 
To obtain the impact of the Bolsa program on (log) enrollment, dropping out and grade 
promotion of children in grades 1-4 and 5-8, we estimate regressions that control for year fixed 
effects, school fixed effects, state-level time trends in schools that adopted Bolsa in 2001, and 
analogous trends for schools that adopted Bolsa in 2002 or later, and time trends based on 
enrollment in 1998 (to reflect the trend to merging small schools).  Moreover, the impacts may 
accumulate over time as students receive the “treatment” for longer periods of time.  So, we create 
lag variables for the Bolsa variable that go back three years.  For all three dependent variables, the 
impacts accumulate over time, but peak after two or three years.  More specifically, the impact on 
the enrollment rate is a 2.8% increase after one year, a 4.3% increase after two years, and a 5.5% 
increase after three years.  Assuming that all of this effect is concentrated on the eligible 
population (i.e. the poor population), which constitute about 43% of the total population of school 
age children, these results indicate that the long-run impact of the program on enrollment rates is 
to raise them about 13% among the eligible population. Similarly, the impact of the Bolsa program 
on dropout rates and grade promotion rates also accumulates over time, although the full effect is 
felt after two years.  The estimates indicate that the program reduces the dropout rate by 0.3 
percentage points after one year and by about 0.45 percentage points after two years.  Assuming 
again that all of this impact is concentrated on the eligible population implies that the program 
reduces the dropout rate for the average person in the eligible population by about 1.0 percentage 
point.  Turning to estimates of the program’s impact on grade promotion rates, they indicate that 
  11the program raises that rate by about 0.5 percentage points after one year and by nearly 1.0 
percentage points after two years, which implies that the long-run impact of the program is to raise 
grade promotion rates by about 2.3 percentage points for the eligible population. 
Similar results are found for children in grades 5-8. Bolsa program appears to increase 
enrollment by about 3.2 percentage points, which (assuming that all of this impact is concentrated 
on 43% of the population that is eligible for the program) implies an increase in enrollment of 
about 7.4 percentage points for the eligible population.  The estimates also indicate that the 
program reduces dropout rates, and raises grade promotion rates, by about 0.3 percentage points 
for the population as a whole, and by about 0.7% of the eligible population. 
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from 1998 to 
current year 
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1998 267,532 187,514 187,514  -  - 
1999 266,645 183,475 174,153  -  - 
2000 261,988 181,532 166,251  -  - 
2001 264,735 177,808 157,081  23.5  13.3 
2002 256,986 172,529 148,209  84.7  76.0 
2003 253,405 169,096 141,716  88.3  83.2 
2004 248,257 143,262 116,285  90.3  85.8 
2005 248,103 136,114 107,243  90.8  86.4 







  15Table 2 – Program Impact on Enrollment, Dropping out and Promotion: Basic Results 
(public schools with grades 1 to 4) 
 
  Log enrollment  Dropping out  Promotion 
Variables  Coef.  S. E.  Coef.  S. E.  Coef.  S. E. 
Basic Model (1998-2005)           
           
School with Bolsa Escola/Familia   .0282***  .0018 -.309 ***  .0582  .533 ***  .0779 
           
Number of observations  699,255    698,229    698,229   
F – test  375.6 ***    350.5 ***    182.3 ***   
           
           
Basic Model (1998-2000 only)           
           
School with Bolsa Escola/Familia 
in 2001, assigned to year 2000  .00136  .0028 -.031  .136  .265  .168 
           
Number of observations  262,220    261,845    261,845   
F – test  71.9 ***    22.3 ***    32.8 ***   
           
           
Adding School/Child Variables           
   (1998-2005)           
           
School with Bolsa Escola/Familia   .0274 ***  .0018 -.310 ***  .058  .530 ***  .0780
Computer lab  .0353 ***  .0033 -.094 *  .056  .604 ***  .0776
Computer .0491  ***  .0031 -.017  .060  .269  ***  .0799
Library .0203  ***  .0027 .090  *  .053  -.102  .0707
Teacher college  .0001 ***  .0000 -.002 ***  .001  .0002  .0010
Program meal  .0125 ***  .0032 -.316 ***  .108  .208  .1365
Program school TV   .0042 **  .0017 -.008 ***  .044  -.121 **  .0569
Program computer  -.0136 ***  .0021 .174  .045  -.403 ***  .0698
Girl  .0014 ***  .0001 -.013 ***  .002  .031 ***  .0031
         
Number of observations  699,255    698,229    698,229   
F – test  353.8 ***    314.1 ***    165.3 ***   
         
         
Control variables (all regressions)          
Dummies for years 98 – 05  yes    yes    yes   
Trend x enrollment level in 98 (08)  yes    yes    yes   
Trend x states x Bolsa in 2001 (27)  yes    yes    yes   
Trend x states x Bolsa in 2002+ (27) yes    yes    yes   
Dummies for Schools (87,407)  yes    yes    yes   
           
 
Robust standard-errors. 
*** significant at 1% level. 
** significant at 5% level. 
* significant at 10% level. 
  16Table 3  - Program Impact on Enrollment, Dropping out and Promotion: 
Adding Interaction Terms 
(public schools with grades 1 to 4, 1998-2005) 
 
  Log enrollment  Dropping out  Promotion 
Variables  Coef.  S. E.  Coef.  S. E.  Coef.  S. E. 
School with Bolsa Program   0.0231 ***  0.0019 -0.324 ***  0.067  0.490 ***  0.089
Computer lab  0.0216 ***  0.0046 -0.070  0.110  0.287 *  0.150
Computer  0.0385 ***  0.0039 0.011  0.091  0.227 *  0.120
Library  0.0104 ***  0.0033 -0.099  0.077  0.247 **  0.100
Teacher college  -0.0001 **  0.0000 -0.003 ***  0.001  0.005 ***  0.002
Program meal  0.0095 ***  0.0034 -0.179  0.118  0.096  0.151
Program school TV   0.0037  0.0023 -0.058  0.066  0.054  0.084
Program computer  -0.0041  0.0026 -0.019  0.071  -0.218 **  0.108
Computer lab x Bolsa Program  0.0155 ***  0.0050 -0.084  0.116  0.612 ***  0.163
Computer  x Bolsa Program  0.0502 ***  0.0045 -0.138  0.107  0.040  0.145
Library x Bolsa Program  0.0243 ***  0.0038 0.357 ***  0.084  -0.749 ***  0.113
Teacher college  x Bolsa Prog  0.0004 ***  0.0001 0.001  0.001  -0.006  0.002
Prog school TV x Bolsa Prog  0.0002   0.0030 0.132 *  0.080  -0.400 ***  0.105
Prog computer  x Bolsa Prog  -0.0084 **  0.0036 0.410 ***  0.089  -0.541 ***  0.142
Girl   0.0004 ***  0.0001 -0.021 ***  0.004  0.038 ***  0.005
Girl x Bolsa Escola/Familia  0.0021 ***  0.0002 0.017 ***  0.004  -0.011 ***  0.006
Age-repetition 98 x Bolsa  -0.0060 ***  0.0012 -0.495 ***  0.033  -0.191 ***  0.043
Black 05 x Bolsa Escola/Fam.  0.0010 ***  0.0001 0.009 ***  0.003  -0.016 *  0.004
Mulato 05 x Bolsa Escola/Fam.  0.0003 ***  0.0001 -0.002  0.001  0.000  0.002
Indigenous 05 x Bolsa Escola  0.0015 ***  0.0001 0.007  0.005  -0.026 ***  0.007
Yellow 05 x Bolsa Escola/Fam.  0.0011 ***  0.0002 0.010 *  0.006  -0.025 ***  0.008
(Enrollment 98/1000) x Bolsa  -0.156 ***  0.0086 -1.524 ***  0.213  0.940 ***  0.269
           
Number of observations  562,408    561,789    561,789   
F – test  238.3 ***    228.2 ***    111.7 ***   
           
Control variables:            
Dummies for years 98 – 05  yes    Yes    yes   
Trend x enrollment in 98 (08)  yes    Yes    yes   
Trend x states x Bolsa in 2001 (27)  yes    Yes    yes   
Trend x states x Bolsa in 2002+ (27)  yes    Yes    yes   
Dummies for Schools (87,407)  yes    Yes    yes   
           
 
Robust standard-errors. 
*** significant at 1% level. 
** significant at 5% level. 
* significant at 10% level. 
 
 
  17Table 4  - Program Impact on Enrollment, Dropping out and Promotion: 
Adding Program Lag Terms 
(public schools with grades 1 to 4, 1998-2005) 
 
  Log enrollment  Dropping out  Promotion 
Variables  Coef.  S. E.  Coef.  S. E.  Coef.  S. E. 
School with Bolsa Program   0.0276 ***  0.0018 -0.299 *** 0.059  0.508 ***  0.079
School with Bolsa lagged 1 year  0.0153 ***  0.0019 -0.245 *** 0.059  0.440 ***  0.082
School with Bolsa lagged 2 year  0.0124 ***  0.0022 -0.023  0.065  0.162 *  0.090
School with Bolsa lagged 3 year  0.00115  0.0024 0.046  0.077  -0.196 *  0.105
Computer lab  0.0348 ***  0.0033 -0.086  0.056  0.586 ***  0.078
Computer  0.0488 ***  0.0031 -0.015  0.060  0.266 ***   0.080
Library  0.0202 ***  0.0026 0.091 *  0.053  -0.104   0.071
Teacher college  0.00014 ***  0.00003 -0.002 *** 0.001  0.000   0.001
Program meal  0.0128 ***  0.0032 -0.321 *** 0.108  0.216  0.136
Program school TV   0.0041 **  0.0017 -0.007  0.044  -0.125 **  0.057
Program computer  -0.0131 ***  0.0021 0.168 ***  0.045  -0.390 *** 0.070
Girl  0.0014 ***  0.00009 -0.013 *** 0.002  0.031 ***  0.003
           
Number of observations  699,255    698,229    698,229   
F – test  340.4 ***    302.2 ***    159.1 ***   
          
Control variables:           
Trend x enrollment in 98 (08)  yes    yes    yes   
Dummies for years 98 – 05  yes    yes    yes   
Trend x states x Bolsa in 2001 (27)  yes    yes    yes   
Trend x states x Bolsa in 2002+ (27)  yes    yes    yes   
Dummies for Schools (87,407)  yes    yes    yes   
           
 
Robust standard-errors. 
*** significant at 1% level. 
** significant at 5% level. 
* significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5 – Program Impact on Enrollment, Dropping out and Promotion: Basic Results 
(public schools with grades 5 to 8) 
 
  Log enrollment  Dropping out  Promotion 
Variables  Coef.  S. E.  Coef.  S. E.  Coef.  S. E. 
Basic Model (1998-2005)           
           
School with Bolsa Escola/Familia   .032***  .0031 -.273 ***  .0751  .282 ***  .0925 
           
Number of observations  182,192    182,007    182,007   
F – test  176.6 ***    119.1 ***    60.9 ***   
           
           
Basic Model (1998-2000 only)           
           
School with Bolsa Escola/Familia 
in 2001, assigned to year 2000  -.00004  .0061 -.157  .230  -.054  .267 
           
Number of observations  68,322    68,204    68,204   
F – test  74.2 ***    9.61 ***    15.5 ***   
           
           
Adding School/Child Variables           
   (1998-2005)           
           
School with Bolsa Escola/Familia   .0317 ***  .0031 -.267 ***  .075  .260 ***  .092
Computer lab  .0096 ***  .0033 -0.176 **  .069  .030  .089
Computer .0080  **  .0036 -.060  .082  -.090  .102
Library -.0079  **  .0031 -.181  ***  .067  -.059  .084
Teacher college  .0000  .0001 .001  .001  -.010 ***  .002
Program meal  -.0036  .0041 -.172  .108  -.341 ***  .129
Program school TV   .0004  .0023 -.105 *  .057  .278 ***  .070
Program computer  -.0144 ***  .0024 -.122 **  .056  .169 **  .071
Girl  -.0014 ***  .0003 -.053 ***  .006  .085 ***  .008
         
Number of observations  182,191    182,006    182,006   
F – test  158.5 ***    107.9 ***    56.8 ***   
         
         
Control variables (all regressions)          
Dummies for years 98 – 05  yes    yes    yes   
Trend x enrollment level in 98 (09)  yes    yes    yes   
Trend x states x Bolsa in 2001 (27)  yes    yes    yes   
Trend x states x Bolsa in 2002+ (27) yes    yes    yes   
Dummies for Schools (22,774)  yes    yes    yes   
           
 
Robust standard-errors. 
*** significant at 1% level. 
** significant at 5% level. 
* significant at 10% level. 